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Abstract
We analyze the interaction between a domestic firm and an international
trade agency in charge of administering an antidumping procedure by means
of a model in which dumping is viewed as an “aggressive” behavior of foreign
firms against domestic firms of a relatively low-efficiency type. An informed
and benevolent agency grants protection exclusively to this type of domes-
tic firms. We introduce asymmetric information about the domestic firm’s
efficiency and let the agency’s decision be influenced by the firm’s choices of
output and lobbying contribution. We characterize (pure-strategy) equilibria
the properties of which shed some light on the way politics and economics
interplay in antidumping, and perform a comparative statics analysis that
highlights some of the benefits of reforming antidumping laws.
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1 Introduction
A paradox that has characterized international trade ever since the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created to encourage world
trade liberalization, is the widespread use by countries of instruments that
turn out to be significant impediments to free trade. Chief among those in-
struments are the antidumping codes that allow GATT signatories to counter
dumping by levying import duties. In fact, work that has examined the func-
tioning of antidumping procedures in various parts of the world (Boltuck and
Litan, 1991) as well as efforts to measure the welfare impact of antidumping
actions (Gallaway et al., 1999) suggest that antidumping might probably be
“...the most costly form of protection” (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001).
The use of antidumping (AD) has grown at an impressive path through-
out the world. For instance, over the last two decades, it has more than
doubled both in the Unites States and the European Union. Meanwhile,
many countries including South-Africa, Brazil, and Mexico have emerged as
new intensive users of AD next to more traditional users such as Australia,
Canada, the EU, New-Zealand, and the US. One reading of these trends
suggests that AD has come to supersede more traditional trade barriers that
countries use to protect their national economies, and hence, according to
this view, antidumping is nothing else than “protectionism in disguise.”
An alternative view has emphasized the notion of “antidumping privati-
zation” reflecting the fact that private firms may use the AD procedure for
their own interest (Hindley and Messerlin, 1996). A growing literature has in-
2
deed analyzed the way antidumping procedures affect the strategic behavior
of firms and the agencies that administer these procedures. In its major part
however, this literature has focused on the strategic interaction between the
domestic and foreign firms, hence, among other things, providing a theory of
how firms reach an agreement (often in quantity) before the final decision of
the regulatory agency (see, e.g., Prusa, 1992 and Zanardi, 2000). One strand
of this literature has explicitly taken into account the information incom-
pleteness inherent to the antidumping process by introducing the possibility
that firms (Kolev and Prusa, 2002) or the agency (Rosendorff, 1996) use an
economic-variable signal to influence the outcome of the process which takes
the form of a voluntary export restraint (VER) or an AD duty.1
On a more empirical front, a strand of this “strategic” AD literature has
stressed the political economy aspect of antidumping. Following the work of
Finger et al. (1982) and drawing on the theories of capture and congressional
dominance, Gasmi et al. (1996) and Hansen and Prusa (1996) find that in-
terest groups’ political campaign (PAC) contributions are a significant factor
in explaining the decision of the International Trade Commission to protect
domestic industries. The main message that comes out of this empirical lit-
erature is that both economic and political factors are needed to explain AD
outcomes. The analysis conducted in this paper sheds some light on the way
these factors interact.
The role of interest groups in the shaping of public policy has attracted
the interest of economists and political scientists for so long. For our purpose,
1More generally, a series of papers have stressed the role of incomplete information in
international trade (see, e.g., Brainard and Martimort, 1997 and Wright, 1998).
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we need to mention Anderson (1994) and Moore and Suranovic (1992) who
examine lobbying in antidumping under a framework that abstracts from in-
formation problems. Accounting for information incompleteness, Rosendorff
(1996) introduces the role of domestic politics in the choice of antidumping
versus VER policies, but the influence of firms is not endogenized. Closer
to our approach, although not concerned with antidumping, Ball (1995) an-
alyzes monetary lobbying under asymmetric information. Along these lines,
Bennedsen and Feldman (2003) introduce information search as an additional
instrument of political influence. In this paper, we assume that the domestic
firm uses lobbying as a monetary instrument of direct influence of the AD
decision in addition to using an economic signal for obtaining a favorable
decision. Our modeling framework therefore allows us to uncover some im-
portant aspects of the interaction between economic and political factors in
antidumping.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic the-
oretical ingredients that we put together to model what we consider as being
the fundamental objective of antidumping laws, namely, to protect domestic
firms that are found to be subject to aggressive behavior of a predatory na-
ture from the part of foreign firms.2 Such domestic firms are assumed to have
some cost “weakness” that makes them vulnerable to foreign firms’ impulses
indeed. The agency in charge of antidumping makes its decision of whether
2Hence, we go beyond the definition of dumping as international price discrimination.
Let us note that our interpretation is reasonably consistent with the “unfair trade” pro-
visions of the GATT. However, we are aware of the fact that the issue of the definition of
predatory behavior is itself not settled. In this paper, dumping is viewed as “aggressive”
behavior which, for all purposes, is assimilated to predatory behavior. For a discussion of
predatory dumping, see Hartigan (1996).
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or not to intervene on the basis of the domestic firm’s efficiency level. The
benchmark case in which this level is common knowledge is discussed in this
section.
In section 3, we assume that the firm’s efficiency parameter is private
information and that the agency infers it from observing the firm’s output.
Strategic signaling then takes place and we characterize equilibrium outcomes
of this game representing the firm-agency relationship. We then introduce
lobbying by the domestic firm as a monetary instrument of direct influence,
taking into account the informational externality it has on the agency’s be-
liefs about the firm’s level of efficiency. We characterize equilibrium outcomes
of this extended model of the firm-agency interaction first under complete
information (section 4) and asymmetric information (section 5). In section 6,
we performs some comparative statics analysis that turn out to be informa-
tive on the role of legislation reforms in antidumping. We conclude the paper
by summarizing our results and giving some directions for future research.
Technical proofs are given in the appendix.
2 The basic theoretical setting
We consider a national market in which a domestic firm faces potential ag-
gressive (predatory) behavior by a foreign firm but may seek protection from
an international trade agency. Within this basic setting, various strategic
aspects involving the firms and the agency can be studied. This paper is con-
cerned with the interaction between the domestic firm and the agency. More
specifically, we examine the process of protection granting by the agency and
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analyze some of the strategies through which the domestic firm can influence
this process. In order to focus on the domestic firm-agency relationship (and
for tractability), we assume a simple formal representation of the foreign
firm’s decision to be aggressive in the domestic market.
The domestic firm is of one of two types. Let θ ∈ {θ, θ}, θ < θ, be a
one-dimensional parameter that designates the type of this firm. Within our
framework, it is useful to think of this parameter as representing the domestic
firm’s marginal cost. A θ-type firm is of a relatively low efficiency (high
marginal cost) and is thus vulnerable to predatory behavior from the part of
the foreign firm. In contrast, a θ-type firm is of a relatively higher efficiency
(lower marginal cost) and is thus less likely to face predatory behavior.3 We
assume that the foreign firm effectively preys on the domestic firm only if
the latter is of a low efficiency type, i.e., of type θ.
We assume that the main objective of the agency is to counter the eco-
nomic effect of the foreign firm’s aggressive behavior, if any, by levying an
antidumping duty on the imported good. More formally, let the binary vari-
able d ∈ {d, d} represent the decision of the agency on a given case, with
d = d if the agency decides to levy an AD duty on the foreign firm’s good
and d = d otherwise. Given the objective of the agency and our assump-
tion about the adoption of predatory behavior by the foreign firm, a socially
3To be sure, for the domestic firm not to be subject to predatory behavior from the
part of the foreign firm it suffices to assume that the efficiency levels of the two firms
are close. Hence, θ might be taken as a level of marginal cost of approximately the same
magnitude as that of the foreign firm.
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desirable outcome would then be
d =
{
d if θ = θ
d if θ = θ
(1)
We see at least two factors that might prevent this ideal situation from
occurring. First, available information on the existence of predatory behavior
is inherently incomplete and hence the agency might make both Type I and
Type II errors. Second, in the domestic firm-agency relationship, private
incentives might not coincide with social incentives leading to outcomes that
are distorted away from this ideal outcome. We incorporate both of these
factors into the basic model and analyze the (equilibrium) behavior of the
domestic firm and the agency. We introduce asymmetric information first
under the assumption that the agency is benevolent, and then we allow for
the possibility that the agency’s decision be influenced by the domestic firm
through monetary transfers.
3 Benevolent antidumping under asymmet-
ric information
Let us assume that the interaction between the domestic firm and the agency
is described by a game the timing of which is shown in Figure 1 below and
discuss the payoff structure of such a game. For a given agency decision-firm
type couple (d; θ), we let U(d; θ) designate the ex post utility of the agency
which is defined for (d; θ) ∈ {(d; θ), (d; θ), (d; θ), d; θ)} by
U(d; θ) =
{
U if (d; θ) ∈ {(d; θ), (d; θ)}
U if (d; θ) ∈ {(d; θ), (d; θ)}
(2)
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where U < U . This specification of the agency’s utility function is consistent
with the preferences of a benevolent agency as reflected in the socially de-
sirable outcome that we described in the previous section. Indeed, it shows
that when it makes the “right” decision, namely, when it only protects a
vulnerable domestic firm, the agency achieves the higher level of utility U .
Time
Nature
draws θ
Firms
discover
θ
Domestic
firm
sets
output
Agency
observes
domestic
firm
output
Agency
makes
decision
Behavior of
foreign firm
learned
-
Figure 1: Timing of events with a benevolent agency
Upstream firms’ interaction takes place in an economic variable that here-
after is taken to be output.4 The output level chosen by the domestic firm,
q, is observed by the agency prior to making its decision d. Let w(q, d; θ)
represent the ex post payoff of the domestic firm at the end of the game
and assume that this payoff is composed of two per-period payoffs. More
specifically, ignoring discounting, this aggregate payoff is
w(q, d; θ) = u(q; θ) + v(d; θ) (3)
The domestic firm’s first-stage payoff u(q; θ) may correspond to the profit
it makes in the output game against the foreign firm. The second-stage
payoff v(d; θ) may be viewed as a reduced form of the profit it makes in the
period that just follows the agency’s decision.5 Note that since the value of
4Alternatively, this variable could represent labor which would be more appropriate
in the case of Europe. As already indicated, for the purpose of this paper, we do not
need to incorporate an explicit model of the firms’ strategic interaction in our theoretical
framework.
5Below, we give an explicite definition of this function v.
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θ unambiguously determines the foreign firm’s output level, there is no need
to use the latter as an argument in the domestic firm’s payoff functions.
For the purpose of this paper, let us assume that the domestic firm chooses
output q ∈ {q, q}, with q < q, and that the low (high) output maximizes the
low- (high-) efficiency firm’s first-period payoff:6
u(q; θ) > u(q; θ) (4)
u(q; θ) > u(q; θ) (5)
The domestic firm’s second-stage payoff function is assumed to take on
the following values:
v(d; θ) =


u(q; θ) if (d; θ) ∈ {(d; θ), (d; θ)}
u(q; θ) + ω if (d; θ) = (d; θ)
u(q, θ) if (d; θ) = (d; θ)
(6)
where ω > 0. Let us say a few words on this component payoff function’s
defining properties.
First, an efficient firm θ that receives a (negative) decision d from the
agency gets a payoff v(d; θ) which is assumed to be the “normal” level that a
domestic firm not subject to predatory behavior would achieve in the quantity
game, namely, u(q; θ). Second, assuming that the AD duty just compensates
for the adverse effect of predatory behavior, an inefficient firm θ that receives
a (positive) decision d gets a payoff v(d; θ) equal to that of an efficient firm
that receives a negative decision, i.e., v(d; θ). Third, when the agency makes
6In a framework where the firm’s output choice set is continuous, the higher output
level q may be interpreted as the equilibrium output of the domestic firm in a standard
quantity game, while the lower output level q may be seen as its equilibrium output in a
game where the foreign moves first in an aggressive manner.
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the wrong decision of imposing a duty in a case involving an efficient firm θ,
this firm enjoys a rent ω on the top of the normal level v(d; θ) it should get.
Finally, when the agency makes the wrong decision of not imposing a duty
in a case involving an inefficient firm θ, the firm obtains the level of payoff
u(q; θ).
Given the values taken by the respective component payoff functions u
and v described above, it is straightforward to derive those of the aggregate
payoff function of the domestic firm w as
w(q, d; θ) =


2u(q; θ) + ω if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
2u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
2u(q; θ) if (q, d; θ) = (q, d; θ)
(7)
The payoffs of the agency and the domestic firm having been described,
we now need to specify the information structure of the game shown in Figure
1 in order to solve for equilibrium.7 Under complete information, i.e., if the
agency knows the domestic firm’s type, then the socially desirable outcome
in which the domestic firm behaves truthfully and the agency makes the right
decision can be achieved. This subgame-perfect equilibrium says: if θ = θ,
then q∗(θ) = q and d∗(q) = d, and if θ = θ, then q∗(θ) = q and d∗(q) = d.8
7In this paper, we restrict attention to equilibria in pure strategies.
8Throughout, we use the symbol “*” to designate state of equilibrium. Note here that,
since the agency observes θ, it can base its decision equivalently on the observation of θ
or that of the firm’s output.
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Suppose now that θ is private information to the firm and that the agency
holds prior beliefs on it defined by Pr(θ = θ) = p and Pr(θ = θ) = 1 − p.
Given that the agency observes the firm’s output level prior to making its
decision, it can infer the firm’s type from this observation. Clearly then, the
domestic firm may use output as a (strategic) signal of its type. Hence, the
analysis of the firm-agency relationship as modeled so far can be cast within
a framework of a signaling game. Figure 2 exhibits the extensive form of this
game.9
(1− p)(p) Nature
q
q¯
Firm θ
q
q¯
Firm θ¯
Agency
Agency
d¯
(2u(q¯; θ) + ω, U)
d
(2u(q¯; θ), U)
d¯
(u(q¯; θ¯) + u(q¯; θ), U)
d
(u(q¯; θ¯) + u(q; θ¯), U)
d¯
(u(q; θ) + u(q¯; θ) + ω, U)
d
(u(q; θ) + u(q¯; θ), U)
d¯
(u(q; θ¯) + u(q¯; θ), U)
d
(u(q¯; θ) + u(q; θ¯), U)
Figure 2: Extensive form of a signaling game with a benevolent agency
Following standard practices (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), we
adopt the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and consider two
types of equilibria. Equilibrium behavior might prescribe a different level
of output for each of the two firm types in which case the equilibrium is
9As is clear from the payoff structure of this game, the output message is costly for the
domestic firm and hence is a credible message, and a signal indeed.
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qualified as “separating.” Alternatively, a “pooling” equilibrium outcome
might occur in which both types choose the same level of output. Let µ(θ|q)
represent the posterior belief function. PBE pure strategies for this game
consist of a pair of firm output and agency decision functions q∗(·) and d∗(·)
defined, respectively, from {θ, θ} to {q, q} and from {q, q} to {d, d}, with the
associated posterior beliefs µ(·|·) satisfying:
q∗(·) ∈ argmaxq w(q, d
∗(·); θ) for θ ∈ {θ, θ} (8)
d∗(·) ∈ argmaxd
∑
θ∈{θ,θ}
µ(θ|q)U(d; θ) (9)
∀q, if ∃θ s.t. q∗(θ) = q, then µ(θ|q) =
Pr(θ)∑
{θ′:q∗(θ′)=q} Pr(θ
′)
(10)
The first two conditions merely require sequential rationality of both the
firm and the agency. The third one says that, whenever possible, the agency
revises its prior beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.10
As is common in such games, since off-equilibrium path beliefs are unre-
stricted, equilibria might emerge that are counter intuitive. To rule out in-
credible strategies and beliefs as equilibria, we impose consistency of believes
that are on off-equilibrium paths by using the familiar intuitive criterion pro-
posed by Cho and Kreps (1987).11 The following proposition characterizes
the intuitive PBE pure strategies of the game.
10The caution “whenever possible” in fact means that this condition can only be applied
to information sets on an equilibrium path. Note that the only free variables are off-
equilibrium path beliefs and are completely arbitrary.
11The intuitive refinement criterion requires first to introduce the notion of an
equilibrium-dominated message (see Gibbons, 1992). In our context, given a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, we will say that the message q is equilibrium-dominated for firm
of type θ if θ’s equilibrium payoff, denoted w∗(θ), is greater than θ’s highest possible
payoff from message q, i.e., w∗(θ) > maxd w(q, d; θ). The intuitive criterion says then
that if the information set following the message q is off the equilibrium path and q is
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Proposition 1. For the signaling game that describes the domestic firm-
agency relationship with a benevolent agency, intuitive PBE pure strategies
are as follows:
• Separating: q∗(θ) = q, q∗(θ) = q, d∗(q) = d, d∗(q) = d, with beliefs
µ(θ|q) = µ(θ|q) = 1, if and only if ∆(θ) ≥ ω, where ∆(θ) ≡ u(q; θ) −
u(q; θ).
• Pooling: q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, d∗(q) = d, with beliefs µ(θ|q) = 1, if and
only if ∆(θ) < ω and p ≤ 1/2.
Proposition 1 shows how a high-efficiency domestic firm can manipulate
information to its advantage. Examine the behavior of such a firm θ across
the two equilibria. This firm weighs the cost of (output-) imitating the less ef-
ficient firm (∆(θ)) against the rent from getting protected by an antidumping
duty (ω). In the separating equilibrium, the imitation cost is high relative to
the rent and the firm decides to behave truthfully. In the pooling equilibrium,
the imitation cost is relatively low and the firm chooses to misrepresent its
type by sending a noisy output signal q. However, since granting protection
to an efficient firm is costly for the agency, the imitation cost is only be part
of the story. In fact, pooling “blurs the picture” for the agency and forces it
to rely on a priori information to make its decision. In this case, since the
agency believes that the domestic firm is likely to be of a low-efficiency type
(p ≡ Pr(θ) ≤ 1/2), it decides to protect it.
equilibrium-dominated for type θ, then the agency’s posterior belief µ(θ|q) must be zero,
that is,
µ(θ|q) = 0 if w∗(θ) > max
d
w(q, d; θ)
whenever the level of production q is not equilibrium-dominated for both types.
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While Proposition 1 offers some useful equilibrium existence results, its
implications show some of the limits of this simple model. In particular,
we see that no pure-strategy pooling equilibrium exists if the agency has
relatively strong prior beliefs that the firm is efficient (p > 1/2).12 If, in
addition, the efficient firm’s imitation cost is less than the rent (∆(θ) < ω),
then an equilibrium in pure strategies simply fails to exist. One way to
circumvent this problem is to enlarge the strategy space of the firm.13 In
view of the large institutional/empirical and theoretical literature on political
influence in international trade policy (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman,
1994 and Hansen and Prusa, 1996), it makes sense for us to explore the
effect of incorporating lobbying as an additional firm’s strategic tool into our
framework. Extending our basic model in this direction allows us to explore
the relationship between economic and political factors in antidumping.
4 Lobbying in antidumping– the complete in-
formation benchmark
Building on the model presented in the previous section, we now introduce
lobbying and write the agency’s payoff as
V (l, d; θ) ≡ U(d; θ) + αl (11)
where l ≥ 0 represents a monetary lobbying contribution by the domestic
firm, α ≤ 1 is the agency’s marginal value of lobbying, and U is the agency’s
12In fact, it can be argued that it should generally be the case that p > 1/2.
13Beyond the fact that, as mentioned, we restrain our investigation of equilibrium to
pure-strategy equilibria, our approach can also be justified on the ground of our objective
to explore the political economy of antidumping.
14
utility defined in (2).14 The domestic firm’s payoff is given by
pi(q, l, d; θ) ≡ w(q, d; θ)− l (12)
where the function w is as defined in (7).
Figure 3 shows the timing of events of this extended game that now in-
cludes a lobbying episode. After the output decision and its observation by
the agency, the domestic firm announces a level of monetary lobbying con-
tribution in return to protection and then the agency makes its antidumping
policy decision.15 The underlying assumption here is that the output deci-
sion is made prior to the processing of an AD case whereas lobbying takes
place once the case has brought before the agency.
Time
Nature
draws θ
Firms
discover θ
Domestic
firm
sets
output
Agency
observes
domestic
firm output
Domestic
firm
sets
lobbying
level
Agency
makes
decision
-
Figure 3: Timing of events with lobbying
Consider the benchmark case in which the agency knows the domestic
firm’s type. We then define subgame-perfect equilibrium pure strategies for
this game as a triple of firm output, firm lobbying contribution, and agency
decision functions q∗(·), l∗(·), and d∗(·) defined, respectively, from {θ, θ} to
14Taking α ≤ 1 allows for both transferable utility (α = 1) and transfer losses (α < 1).
This specification follows the standard literature on lobbying (see, e.g., Grossman and
Helpman, 2002).
15We assume that the firm commits to its announce and, without loss of generality,
we set the lobbying contribution announce contingent to an agency’s negative decision to
zero.
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{q, q}, from {θ, θ} to R+, and from {q, q} × R+ to {d, d} such that:
q∗(·) ∈ argmaxq pi(q, l
∗, d∗(·); θ) for θ ∈ {θ, θ} (13)
l∗(·) ∈ argmaxl pi(q, l, d
∗(·); θ) for θ ∈ {θ, θ} (14)
d∗(·) ∈ argmaxd V (l, d; θ) (15)
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of this sequential game
of complete information.
Proposition 2. The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game with lobbying
between the domestic firm and the agency has the following form:
• If θ = θ, then q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ) = 0, and d∗(q, 0) = d.
• If θ = θ, then q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ) = lci ≡ (U − U)/α, and d∗(q, lci) = d, if
and only if lci ≤ ω.
As expected, under complete information, a low-efficiency firm (θ) need
not make a lobbying transfer in order to obtain protection from the agency. In
contrast, a high-efficiency firm (θ) has an incentive to lobby since lobbying
is the only channel through which it can hope to gain protection. This
firm will engage in lobbying and the agency will indeed grant protection,
and both won’t have a unilateral incentive te deviate, if the firm makes the
minimal amount of transfer that will return a positive decision from the
agency. Clearly, such a minimal level of successful lobbying under complete
information, lci, solves V (lci, d; θ) − V (0, d; θ) = 0, where V is as defined in
(11), and hence is given by (U−U)/α as stated in the proposition. Note that
the higher the agency’s marginal value of lobbying α, the lower this minimal
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level of lobbying contributions that would induce protection of the efficient
firm under complete information.
5 Lobbying in antidumping under asymmet-
ric information
With lobbying incorporated into the model, we now return to the case where
the agency does not observe the firm’s type but holds prior beliefs given
by p, the probability that the domestic firm is cost efficient, i.e., of type
θ. Since lobbying takes place after, successively, the firm has chosen output
and the agency has observed it (see Figure 3), we assume that the agency
updates its beliefs twice: once after the firm’s output decision and once after
its lobbying decision. The important point here is that the choice of output
conveys information that the agency can cross-examine with the information
that the choice of lobbying later provides. This suggests that, from the
firm’s perspective, there is a strategic link between the choices of output and
lobbying when it comes to shaping the agency’s beliefs. We give a formal
representation of this link.
Let µ(θ|q) represent the first posterior beliefs of the agency, i.e., the beliefs
updated on the basis of the firm’s output choice q, and ζ(θ|µ(·), l) refer to
the second posterior beliefs, i.e., the beliefs updated on the basis of the firm’s
lobbying choice l and given the first posterior beliefs held by the agency.
A peculiar feature of this structure of beliefs is that while first posterior
beliefs are updated versions of prior beliefs, second posterior beliefs are up-
dated versions of first posterior beliefs. Consequently, Bayesian consistency
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requires:
∀q, if ∃θ s.t. q∗(θ) = q, then µ(θ|q) =
Pr(θ)∑
{θ′:q∗(θ′)=q} Pr(θ
′)
(16)
and
∀l, if ∃θ s.t. l∗(θ, q) = l, then ζ(θ|µ(·), l) =
µ(θ|q)∑
{θ′:l∗(θ′,q)=l} µ(θ
′|q)
(17)
Consistency thus requires that the agency be able to perfectly update its
beliefs if at least one of the choices (output or lobbying) made by the two
types of firms are different. On the contrary, if both choices are similar for
the two types, nothing can be inferred by the agency.
We now turn to the resolution of this signaling game with double updating
of beliefs. We define PBE pure strategies as a triple of firm output, lobbying
contribution, and agency decision functions q∗(·), l∗(·), and d∗(·) defined,
respectively, from {θ, θ} to {q, q}, from {θ, θ}×{q, q} to R+, and from {q, q}×
R+ to {d, d} satisfying:
q∗(·) ∈ argmaxq pi(q, l
∗, d∗(·); θ) for θ ∈ {θ, θ} (18)
l∗(·) ∈ argmaxl pi(q, l, d
∗(·); θ) for θ ∈ {θ, θ} (19)
d∗(·) ∈ argmaxd
∑
θ∈{θ,θ}
ζ(θ|µ(·|q), l)V (d, l; θ) (20)
with associated first and second posterior beliefs µ(·|q) and ζ(·|µ, l) that,
respectively, verify (16) and (17).
Given that first and second posterior beliefs are not restricted on off-
equilibrium paths, we expect multiple equilibria to exist for this game with
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an extended strategy space for the firm. In view of our findings in the previ-
ous sections, we choose to restrict our analysis to cases where the (truthful)
separating output strategies with q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, and the (dis-
torted) pooling strategies with q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q can be sustained as equi-
librium strategies. Besides the fact that these output strategies have some
intuitive appeal, recall that they were part of the equilibrium outcomes of the
game without lobbying under both complete and incomplete information (see
Proposition 1). A cross-analysis of the equilibrium conditions will then give
us an idea of the extent to which the introduction of lobbying in the model
affects the likelihood of these output strategies emerging in equilibrium.
When lobbying is feasible and under complete information (see Proposi-
tion 2), we saw that, since it cannot strategically use output, the only way for
the efficient firm to gain protection is to invest in some minimal but positive
amount of lobbying lci. As we will see below, this option with separating
strategies is still a possibility under asymmetric information. Moreover, be-
cause the agency has inferior information on the firm’s type, the efficient firm
can also manage to obtain protection with less lobbying (if p > 1/2) and even
with no lobbying at all (if p ≤ 1/2) by misrepresenting its type.
Proposition 3. With output and lobbying as instruments of influence, the
separating output strategies q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q can be part of a PBE
both with and without lobbying:
• Case with lobbying (if lci ≤ min{∆(θ), ω}):
q∗(θ) = q, q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ, q) = 0, l∗(θ, q) = lci, d∗(q, 0) = d∗(q, lci) = d,
with beliefs µ(θ|q) = µ(θ|q) = 1, ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), 0) = ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), lci) = 1.
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• Case without lobbying (if ω < min{lci,∆(θ)}):
q∗(θ) = q, q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ, q) = l∗(θ, q) = 0, d∗(q, 0) = d, d∗(q, 0) = d,
with beliefs µ(θ|q) = µ(θ|q) = 1, ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), 0) = ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), 0) = 1.
By allowing for the possibility of lobbying, we see that optimal quantities
can be chosen both in the case where the agency protects the two types of
firms and in the case where only the less efficient firm receives a protection.
We know from Proposition 1 that when lobbying is not a choice variable for
the domestic firm, only the second possibility can happen in equilibrium.
Now that lobbying is introduced, the domestic firm disposes of two instru-
ments to maximize its payoff. Provided that the rent from getting protected
is sufficiently high, it is the comparison between the output imitation cost,
∆(θ), and the lobbying contribution cost, lci, that matters for the more effi-
cient firm.
For this firm, when the rent from protection is low, the lobbying activity
is not profitable and we are back to the separating case without protection
encountered in Proposition 1. When the rent is high, lobbying becomes
attractive and most importantly it alleviates the incentive constraint on the
quantity choice. In Proposition 1, we saw that the condition for the existence
of a separating equilibrium is that the rent ω be lower than the imitation
cost ∆(θ). With lobbying, we see that even if the rent is high, a separating
equilibrium may exist since what needs only to be checked is that lci ≤ ∆(θ).
Hence, in addition to allowing the firm to “buy” protection, the presence of
lobbying takes out the rent from the incentive constraint on output choice,
and hence relaxes it.
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These two effects of lobbying taken together allow a separating equilib-
rium with protection of both types of firms to emerge. An important conse-
quence of the introduction of lobbying is then to lessen the constraints needed
for the existence of a separating equilibrium, making information revelation
more likely. This result is consistent with the findings of the literature on
monetary lobbying under incomplete information. For example, Ball (1995)
shows that lobbying can be (social) welfare-enhancing when it is used as a
signaling device to the extent that it conveys information that allow gov-
ernment to improve their policies. In our framework, this positive effect is
reflected in the increase of the less efficient firm’s welfare due to the fact that
this firm gets protected with no lobbying cost whenever there is information
revelation.
We just saw that the additional instrument (lobbying) allows the more
efficient firm to obtain protection without the need to distort output. We
however observe that the lobbying contribution that yields protection in the
separating equilibrium is equal to the contribution that this firm would make
under complete information (see Proposition 3) which can be high. This sug-
gests that there exists a tradeoff between the cost of output distortion and
that of lobbying as confirmed by the next proposition. Indeed, this proposi-
tion shows that the more efficient firm can reduce the lobbying contribution
that will induce protection by distorting output.
Proposition 4. With output and lobbying as instruments of influence, the
pooling output strategies q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q can be part of a PBE both with
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and without lobbying, with associated posterior beliefs
µ(θ|q) =
{
p if q = q
1 if q = q
(21)
and
ζ(θ|µ(·), l) =
{
µ(θ|q) if l ≤ l˜
1 if l > l˜
(22)
where l˜ is the level of lobbying on which the two types pool. These PBE
correspond to
• Case with lobbying (if p > 1/2, lii ≡ (U−U)(2p−1)/α) ≤ min{u(q; θ)−
u(q; θ), ω}, and ∆(θ) + lii ≤ min{lci, ω}):
q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ, q) = l∗(θ, q) = lii, d∗(q, lii) = d, with beliefs
given above and l˜ = lii;
• Case without lobbying (if p ≤ 1/2, ∆(θ) ≤ min{lci, ω}):
q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ, q) = l∗(θ, q) = 0, and d∗(q, 0) = d, with beliefs
given above and l˜ = 0.
This proposition reveals an interesting effect. The existence of the pooling
equilibrium (on q) is no longer constrained by the value of the agency’s prior
on θ while in Proposition 1 this prior had to be low. The possibility that the
agency believes that a given firm is most likely to be of the more efficient
type doesn’t preclude pooling strategies since both types of firms can lobby
to obtain protection as can be seen from the case with p > 1/2 of Proposition
4. But, there is a strong link between output and lobbying decisions. Pooling
on the lower output level q is possible only if it is accompanied by pooling
strategies on lobbying contributions. This is so because with two channels of
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influence, keeping the agency uninformed might indeed be beneficial for the
firm.
The critical player here is the more efficient firm. The reason why this firm
may be interested in a pooling strategy is that, in this case, the uninformed
agency cannot rule out the possibility that the firm is of the less efficient
type. The main consequence of a pooling output strategy is then to alleviate
the participation constraint of the agency at the lobbying-stage game, i.e.,
to reduce the amount of lobbying necessary to induce an agency’s decision
that is favorable to the more efficient firm.16 Hence, the relevant comparison
for this firm is that of the cost of pooling on output ∆(θ), i.e., the cost of
imitating the lower-efficient type, with the cost of deviating to a separating
strategy that brings with it a lobbying cost lci that is greater than lii.
As noted above, this comparison makes sense only if the less efficient firm
is willing to engage in lobbying which, as can easily be checked, is true if
lii ≤ u(q; θ) − u(q; θ). Indeed, if there is lobbying separation, the agency
becomes completely informed and this changes its participation constraint in
the lobbying-stage game. A low output would then no longer be optimal for
the more efficient firm since the cost of this output distortion would not be
compensated by a lower lobbying contribution.
The interdependence between the two instruments (output and lobbying)
16This information cross-effect between the output and lobbying instruments is in the
spirit of an effect discussed by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2003). They propose a model
where interest groups influence political actors’ decisions through the provision of verifiable
information and lobbying contributions. They show that a lobby might find it worthwhile
to abandon information provision because this might induce an information externality
that leads to an increase of the lobbying cost.
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makes the effect of lobbying more complex and an important consequence of
this interdependence is that it can imply a bias towards pooling strategies.17
Hence, the less efficient firm might be penalized since it gets a protection
only if it lobbies as much as the more efficient firm, a feature of the pooling
equilibrium to which we will return in the next section.
6 Role of antidumping legislation
A factor that has played an important role in much of the analysis so far is
the imitation cost of the more efficient firm that, in our framework, reflects
the direct loss in utility that this firm incurs when it chooses the level of
output that the less efficient firm would normally supply. Ideally, such a cost
should be endogenous to the rules of the antidumping procedure. While the
relationship between the antidumping laws and the behavior of firms largely
deserves a study by itself, even a fully-fledged model of how the antidumping
legislation affects the cost of imitation is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, one still can make assumptions on some important aspects of this
relationship and perform comparative statics exercises.
Let us assume that an antidumping legislation can be characterized by a
one-dimensional parameter Ψ ∈
[
Ψ,Ψ
]
, Ψ < Ψ, that represents its more or
less stringent nature and further assume that a legislation of type Ψ′ is strictly
more stringent than one of type Ψ′′ if and only if Ψ′ > Ψ′′. This parameter
Ψ may for example correspond to the level of marginal cost above which a
17If the economic signal (taken to be output in this paper) represents labor, an implica-
tion of this result is that an efficient firm would chose to reduce employment in order to
decrease the lobbying contribution that would induce protection.
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firm is a priori considered by the agency to be of a less efficient type θ and
hence potentially entitled to receive protection.18 Under this interpretation,
clearly a higher level of Ψ makes it, all things equal, harder for a firm to
credibly pretend that it needs protection from the agency. Accordingly, it
makes sense to assume that the more stringent the antidumping legislation,
the higher the imitation cost, or more formally that ∆(θ) is strictly increasing
in Ψ.
Under this same interpretation of Ψ and assuming that the agency “esti-
mates” its prior p from frequency data on a fixed-size sample of representative
firms, one can further assume that, all things equal, the more stringent the
legislation, the higher the probability that a given firm is a priori taken to
be of the higher efficiency type θ by the agency. The following result is then
directly established from the expression of the level of lobbying necessary to
induce protection in the pooling equilibrium, lii (see Proposition 4):19
Proposition 5. As the antidumping legislation becomes more stringent, i.e.,
as Ψ increases, the (pooling) equilibrium level of lobbying that yields protec-
tion, lii, increases.
From this proposition, one can infer that reforming antidumping laws
so as to make them more severe has a double negative effect on the likely
occurrence of the pooling equilibrium with lobbying. In fact, since both
∆(θ) (as assumed) and lii (as stated in Proposition 5) are increasing in Ψ,
such a reform would increase the likelihood of the conditions characterizing
18The closer Ψ is from its lower bound Ψ, the more light-handed the intervention of the
agency.
19A maintained assumption in this section is that the agency’s prior is sufficiently large,
more specifically, p > 1/2.
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the pooling equilibrium with lobbying being violated (see Proposition 4). A
more stringent procedure (a higher Ψ) increases the cost of the more efficient
firm imitating the less efficient firm in output, and hence should make the
former reluctant to implement output pooling. This is a direct effect of the
reform via the firm’s choice of output. Proposition 5 reveals yet an indirect
effect of the reform via its positive impact on the agency’s prior p that renders
protection for the firm more costly in terms of lobbying when there is pooling
in output.20 It is worth noting that in the context of this pooling equilibrium,
these implications provide a positive theory justification for why firms that
lobby would oppose reforms of antidumping laws while agencies would favor
such reforms.
Our previous discussion has highlighted two channels through which re-
forms of antidumping laws may affect the equilibrium outcome, through their
effect on the firm’s cost of shirking (direct effect) and through their effect
on the agency’s beliefs (indirect effect). More specifically, we found that if
the conditions that yield the pooling equilibrium with lobbying are met (see
Proposition 4 for these conditions), then making an antidumping legislation
more stringent leads to higher cost of protection-inducing lobbying coupled
with output distortion by efficient firms. This raises questions about the wel-
fare consequences of this type of reforms that are worth exploring. To pave
the way for such an analysis though, we should recognize that the pooling
20Following an increase in Ψ, a given firm is more likely to be considered of the more
efficient type, and so it is as if the agency revised its prior belief p upward. Because
pooling in output is not informative for the agency, the latter has an incentive to trade
protection for a larger amount of lobbying money. Note that this effect on lobbying can be
substantial as can be checked from the sensitivity to the prior p of the ratio of the lobbying
under asymmetric information to that under complete information, lii/lci (= 2p− 1).
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equilibrium embodies the features that will possibly condamne it as an actual
equilibrium outcome in a context of active antidumping reforms.21
Hence, for the the purpose of the next exercise we enlarge the set of
possible equilibrium outcomes to include the other (and only the other)
equilibria analyzed in the previous section. Let us denote the pooling equi-
librium with lobbying Pl and, for simplicity of the analysis, assume that
p > 1/2 so that only the two equilibria that were characterized in Propo-
sition 3, namely, the separating equilibrium with lobbying, Sl, and the sep-
arating equilibrium without lobbying, Snl, can be incorporated into the set
of possible equilibria. For an antidumping legislation of a given type Ψ, let
E(Ψ) ≡ {Pl(Ψ), Sl(Ψ), Snl(Ψ)} be the set of candidate equilibrium outcomes
that can be sustained under this legislation. Let IΨ ⊂
[
Ψ,Ψ
]
be the interval
of antidumping legislation types over which at least one of the equilibria in
E is sustainable, and let AΨ, Ψ ∈ IΨ, designate the actual equilibrium which
is sustainable under the legislation Ψ.22,23
Assume that the three feasible equilibrium types are ordered according
to the level of “social welfare” achieved as Snl ºW Sl ºW Pl, where for any
two equilibria E1 and E2, E1 ºW E2 means that a move from E2 to E1
21Indeed, as Ψ gets higher, the firm faces increasing lobbying-costs of protection, and
there clearly will be a level of Ψ above which separating behavior will substitute to pooling
behavior.
22Given that mixed strategies are not taken into account in this paper, considering only
Pl, Sl, and Snl as the only possible equilibria clearly brings up the issue of equilibrium
existence. We realize, indeed, that there is a small set of values of the exogenous parameter
of the model Ψ over which no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
23Outside the small interval mentioned in the previous footnote over which no pure-
strategy equilibrium exists, it is easy to see from their characterization in Propositions
3 and 4 that, for a given Ψ, the three equilibrium types considered here are mutually
exclusive.
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weakly increases social welfare.24 Given these social preferences over the set
of feasible equilibrium outcomes, the next proposition basically says that,
in an economy producing with a priori sufficiently efficient firms, a reform
towards a harsher antidumping legislation is socially desirable:
Proposition 6. Assume that the imitation cost ∆(θ) is strictly increasing
in Ψ and that the agency’s prior p is sufficiently large (p > 1/2). Then, for
any two antidumping legislation types Ψ1, Ψ2 ∈ IΨ such that Ψ1 < Ψ2, we
have AΨ2 ºW AΨ1.
This proposition takes further the inferences drawn from Proposition 5
about the benefits of an active reform that tightens an antidumping legisla-
tion. It says that such a reform can never lead to a move from a separating
equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium. Moreover, for a reform that erects suf-
ficiently high barriers to firms’ output misrepresentation, through a higher
marginal cost threshold, say, a move from the pooling equilibrium to the
separating equilibrium leading to welfare enhancement is possible. Provided
that the antidumping legislation is sufficiently stringent, the argument can
even be further stretched. Indeed, any policy that pushes up the level of
lobbying under complete information, lci, i.e., that renders the fulfilling of
the agency’s participation constraint more difficult, should be seen as highly
beneficial since it gives the separating equilibrium without lobbying at all
the highest likelihood of occurrence.25
24This ordering says then that the level of social welfare decreases when moving from
an equilibrium of type Snl to one of type Sl, and from an equilibrium of type Sl to one
of type Pl. The underlying reason for this ordering lies in the “rent seeking” nature of
lobbying under an equilibrium outcome of a Sl or a Pl type and the social cost that output
distortion imposes under an equilibrium of type Pl.
25A policy that decreases the agency’s marginal value of lobbying, α, would certainly
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7 Conclusion
In a model of the domestic firm-agency interaction in antidumping, we have
analyzed some implications of asymmetric information about the firm’s ef-
ficiency on equilibrium behavior. When output only is used by the firm to
signal its type to the agency, an incentive issue arises: separating strategies
correspond to optimal quantity choices but induce that the firm of the more
efficient type doesn’t receive a protection. Hence, the domestic firm may
face contradictory forces because the rent generated by protection gives it
an incentive to adopt pooling strategies while the agency’s lack of informa-
tion implies that it grants protection to the firm only if it believes a priori
that the firm is likely to be of the less efficient type. Hence, for the case
where both the rent from protection and the prior on the efficient type are
sufficiently high, this basic model leads to an impasse.
To circumvent this difficulty, we have introduced lobbying as an additional
instrument that the firm can use to influence the antidumping outcome. The
more efficient firm can now afford not to distort output and still get a pro-
tection by making a lobbying contribution. This firm’s incentive constraint
is alleviated since it does not face the tradeoff between rent from protection
and cost of output distortion. Moreover, by inducing information revela-
tion, separating strategies lead to protection at no lobbying cost for the less
efficient firm.
The introduction of a second tool to influence the agency’s decision high-
achieve such a result.
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lights another effect which is due to the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion. In our model, output and lobbying decisions occur sequentially so that
the output chosen by the firm can possibly modify the agency’s beliefs be-
fore lobbying takes place. A consequence of this structure of information
transmission is that separating strategies on output make the agency com-
pletely informed. In order to reduce the lobbying contribution that induces
protection, the more efficient firm may then prefer to pool on the output
choice. Thus, introducing lobbying as an instrument of influence in addition
to output tends to favor, all things equal, pooling as an equilibrium behavior,
provided that the more efficient firm does not incur too high a cost when it
goes on to imitate the less efficient firm in output.
The emergence of this pooling equilibrium outcome fundamentally rests
on two assumptions. First, the imitation cost has to be relatively low. Sec-
ond, the agency’s prior, i.e., its belief that a given firm is not in need of pro-
tection, although allowed to be greater than one-half, has to be sufficiently
remote from one.26 In our framework, these characteristics taken together
correspond to a loose antidumping legislation. A reform of the AD legisla-
tion that substantially increases the imitation cost turns out to increase the
lobbying cost as well, and hence is likely to threaten the occurrence of this
pooling equilibrium. Furthermore, in addition to making this equilibrium less
probable, a reform that toughens an antidumping legislation makes separat-
ing behavior and information revelation most likely. The very benefit of this
type of reforms lies in their ability to break the link between economic and
26Indeed, a too high prior would lead to a level of lobbying cost under incomplete
information close to that under complete information.
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political strategies that firms, thanks to information asymmetries inherent
to antidumping, use to strengthen their market position through protection.
Further research is warranted. First, our model doesn’t make the dis-
tinction between a direct lobbying assimilated to a collusion between the
domestic firm and the agency and an indirect lobbying through the politi-
cal institutions that oversee the agency. Second, although we mention some
preferences of firms and agency over reforms of the antidumping legislation,
there clearly is a need to introduce within the framework of our model a
distinction between lobbying to implement existing laws favorably and lob-
bying to change the laws in a favorable manner. Disentangling these various
aspects of lobbying would certainly enhance our understanding of the com-
plex antidumping process. Third, while this paper has considered the impact
of lobbying on the decision of the agency on a given case, it would also be
instructive to investigate how it affects the other important outcome of the
antidumping process, namely, the withdrawal of a case once a VER agree-
ment has been reached. Last but not least, given the growth of antidumping
cases and the availability of data on those cases, empirically testing some of
the important implications of the analysis in this paper seems particularly
promising.
31
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We start by characterizing the best response of
the agency when the posterior beliefs are given:27
Claim 1. Given an output choice q by the domestic firm, d∗(q) = d if
µ(θ|q) ≥ 1/2 and d∗(q) = d if µ(θ|q) < 1/2.
Proof. The result comes from the fact that the agency maximizes its payoff by
choosing d if and only if µ(θ|q)U +[1− µ(θ|q)]U ≥ µ(θ|q)U +[1− µ(θ|q)])U ,
that is, if and only if µ(θ|q) ≤ 1/2, i.e., µ(θ|q) ≥ 1/2.
We now examine the four possible pure-strategy equilibrium candidates.
Claim 2. The separating case with q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, d∗(q) = d and
d∗(q) = d, with beliefs µ(θ|q) = 1 and µ(θ|q) = 1, constitutes a PBE if and
only if ∆(θ) ≥ ω.
Proof. Bayes’ rule implies that µ(θ|q) = 1 and µ(θ|q) = 1 and the agency
chooses d∗(q) = d and d∗(q) = d by Claim 1. The θ-type firm clearly has
no incentive to deviate and the same is true for the θ-type if and only if
u(q; θ)− u(q; θ) ≥ ω, i.e., ∆(θ) ≥ ω.
Claim 3. The separating case with q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q is not a PBE.
Proof. Bayes’ rule implies that µ(θ|q) = 1 and µ(θ|q) = 1. Hence, d∗(q) = d
and d∗(q) = d by Claim 1. Then, clearly, the firm of type θ has an incentive
to switch from q to q.
27We assume that the agency protects the firm when it is indifferent between protection
and no protection.
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Claim 4. The pooling case with q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, and d∗(q) = d, with
beliefs µ(θ|q) = p, constitutes a PBE if and only if p ≤ 1/2, ω < ∆(θ), and
µ(θ|q) > 1/2.
Proof. Bayes’ rule implies that µ(θ|q) = p. By Claim 1, the best response of
the agency is d if and only if p ≤ 1/2 and d otherwise. Now, consider the
behavior of the firm and suppose first that p > 1/2. Then, since d∗(q) = d,
the θ-firm should deviate as 2u(q; θ) > u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) (see (5)). Thus, we
require p ≤ 1/2. If the off-equilibrium beliefs are such that µ(θ|q) ≤ 1/2,
then d∗(q = d (by Claim 1) and this firm won’t have an incentive to deviate
iff u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω > 2u(q; θ) + ω, a contradiction to (5). Now, assume
then µ(θ|q) > 1/2. By Claim 1, d∗(q = d, and the θ-firm won’t deviate iff
u(q; θ)+u(q; θ)+ω > 2u(q; θ), i.e., ∆(θ) < ω. Finally, concerning the θ-firm,
when p ≤ 1/2, d∗(q) = d (by Claim 1) and (4) imply that a deviation from
q to q is detrimental.
Claim 5. The pooling case with q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, and d∗(q) = d, with
beliefs µ(θ|q) = p, constitutes a PBE if and only if p ≤ 1/2, 2u(q; θ) <
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ), and µ(θ|q) < 1/2.
Proof. Bayes’ rule yields µ(θ|q) = p. The agency then sets d∗(q) = d if
and only if p ≤ 1/2 and d∗(q) = d otherwise. Assume first that p > 1/2.
Since d∗(q) = d, the θ-firm clearly has an incentive to deviate since u(q; θ) +
u(q; θ) < 2u(q; θ) (see (4)). Equilibrium behavior thus requires p ≤ 1/2
which we assume. If µ(θ|q) ≥ 1/2, then d∗(q) = d by Claim 1, and this firm
won’t have an incentive to deviate iff u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) > u(q; θ) + u(q; θ), a
contradiction to (4). Hence, assume that µ(θ|q) < 1/2, in which case, by
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Claim 1, d∗(q) = d. Then the θ-firm won’t deviate iff 2u(q; θ) < u(q; θ) +
u(q; θ). As to the θ-firm, when p ≤ 1/2, d∗(q) = d (by Claim 1) and (5)
imply that a deviation from q to q is not beneficial.
Claim 6. Among the three PBE, only the following two satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion:
• The separating case with q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, d∗(θ) = d and
d∗(θ) = d, with beliefs µ(θ|q) = 1 and µ(θ|q) = 1, constitutes an Intu-
itive PBE if and only if ∆(θ) ≥ ω.
• The pooling case with q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, and d∗(q) = d, with beliefs
µ(θ|q) = p, constitutes an Intuitive PBE if and only if p ≤ 1/2, ω <
∆(θ), and µ(θ|q) = 1.
Proof. The intuitive criterion imposes a restriction only on beliefs that are
based on off equilibrium information sets (see footnote (11)). Hence, our
separating equilibrium clearly satisfies the criterion. In the equilibrium with
pooling on q, q is equilibrium-dominated for the type θ firm, since its equi-
librium utility w∗(θ) ≡ w(q, d; θ) > maxd w(q, d, θ). Hence, the intuitive
criterion implies that µ(θ|q) = 0. Since we must have µ(θ|q) > 1/2 and there
is no equilibrium-dominated strategy for type θ, pooling on q is not elimi-
nated by setting µ(θ|q) = 1. Consider now the equilibrium with pooling on q.
In this equilibrium, q is equilibrium-dominated for the type θ firm, since this
firm’s equilibrium utility w∗(θ) ≡ w(q, d; θ) > maxd w(q, d, θ). Thus, the in-
tuitive criterion requires that µ(θ|q) = 0 since q is not equilibrium-dominated
for type θ. But, this is in contradiction with µ(θ|q) > 1/2, a condition re-
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quired for equilibrium to exist. Hence, the intuitive criterion rules out this
equilibrium with pooling on q.
Proposition 1 in the text merely states Claim 6. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Under complete information, equations (4) and
(5) imply that q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q. Let us examine next the firm-agency
interaction in lobbying. First, consider the case where θ = θ. Facing this
high-cost firm, the agency maximizes its payoff by setting d∗(θ, l) = d for
any l ≥ 0. Since lobbying is costly for the firm, we obviously have l∗ = 0 in
this case. Let us now turn to the case where θ = θ. The agency then would
choose d = d if and only if U +αl ≥ U , that is, if and only if l ≥ lci, where lci
is as defined in the proposition. The θ-firm would want to induce a decision
d from the agency if and only the benefit from this decision is larger than the
cost of inducing it, namely, if and only if 2u(q; θ) + ω − l∗ ≥ 2u(q; θ), that
is, if and only if l∗ ≤ ω. Hence, l∗ = min{lci, ω}. When ω < lci, any level of
lobbying l˜ ∈ [0, ω] is a best response to the agency’s decision since d is never
chosen in equilibrium. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the proposition using a series of claims:
Claim 7. If q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, then equilibrium beliefs µ and ζ are
such that the agency is completely informed on θ.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the output strategies and the require-
ment of Bayesian consistency for equilibrium beliefs.
Claim 8. If q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, then the efficient firm’s lobbying
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strategy is l∗(θ) = min{lci, ω}.
Proof. By Claim 7, the agency is completely informed and thus Proposition
2 can be used to obtain the case with lci ≤ ω. The case with lci > ω merely
corresponds to a possible equilibrium response of the firm.
Claim 9. If q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, l∗(θ) = lci and l∗(θ) = 0, and lci ≤ ω,
then the incentive constraint of the efficient firm is given by lci ≤ ∆(θ), and
there is no incentives constraint for the inefficient firm.
Proof. The firm of type θ obtains a protection by choosing its most preferred
output choice q and setting l∗(θ) = 0. It thus has no incentive to deviate.
The θ-type firm is successful in lobbying whenever ω ≥ lci. Under this case, it
is not profitable for it to mimic the other type if and only if 2u(q; θ)+ω−lci ≥
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω, i.e., if and only if lci ≤ ∆(θ).
Claim 10. Separating output strategies q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, lobby-
ing strategies l∗(θ) = 0 and l∗(θ) = lci, and the agency’s decision rule
d∗(q, lci) = d∗(q, 0) = d, together with associated beliefs µ(θ|q) = µ(θ|q) = 1,
ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), 0) = ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), lci) = 1, constitute a PBE if lci ≤ min{∆(θ), ω}.
Proof. This claim follows from Claim 8 and Claim 9 and the fact that the two
conditions lci ≤ ω and lci ≤ ∆(θ) can be summarized by lci ≤ min{∆(θ), ω}.
Claim 11. If q∗(θ) = q and q∗(θ) = q, then these separating output strategies
with l∗(·) = 0, constitute a PBE if ω < min{lci,∆(θ)}.
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Proof. With lobbying being too costly, i.e., ω < lci, we just have to look
at the incentive constraint of the efficient type when it cannot use lobbying
under complete information. From Proposition 1, we know that it prefers
not to switch from q to q if ω < ∆(θ).
Proposition 3 then follows from merging Claim 10 and Claim 11. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. The following series of claims will prove useful:
Claim 12. If q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, then separating lobbying strategies are not
optimal, i.e., one cannot have l∗(θ) 6= l∗(θ).
Proof. Because of the consistency of beliefs, separating lobbying strategies
imply that the agency is completely informed, so that the efficient firm has
to made lobbying up to lci to obtain protection. But then, by backward
induction, it is easy to see that the pooling output strategy for this firm is no
longer optimal (under complete information, only the efficient output choice
is optimal).
Observe that Claim 12 precludes separating lobbying strategies in equilib-
rium if there is pooling on output. Let us denote by l˜ the level of lobbying on
which the two types pool. As out-off equilibrium beliefs are needed to com-
pute lobbying strategies, let us suppose from now on that second posterior
beliefs are given by:
ζ(θ|µ(q), l) =
{
µ(θ|q) if l ≤ l˜
1 if l > l˜
(23)
Then, the following is true:
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Claim 13. If q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q and second posterior beliefs satisfy (23),
then the level of lobbying necessary to induce protection is l˜ ≥ 0 if p ≤ 1/2
and l˜ ≥ lii ≡ (U − U)(2p− 1)/α if p > 1/2.
Proof. By Bayes’ rule µ(θ|q) = p, and thus ζ(θ|µ(θ|q), l˜) = p. If p ≤ 1/2,
pU(d, θ)+(1−p)U(d, θ) ≥ pU(d, θ)+(1−p)U(d, θ), and hence d∗ = d without
lobbying. For p > 1/2, the level of lobbying under incomplete information,
lii, can easily be seen to solve pV (lii, d; θ) + (1− p)V (lii, d; θ)− pV (0, d; θ)−
(1 − p)V (0, d; θ) = 0, where V = U(d; θ) + αl, and hence is given by (2p −
1)(U − U)/α as stated in the claim.
Claim 14. If q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, second posterior beliefs satisfy (23), and
p > 1/2, lobbying is effective for both firms, i.e. l∗(·) > 0, only if lii ≤
min{u(q; θ)− u(q; θ), ω}.
Proof. Using Claim 12 and Claim 13, lii ≤ ω is the only condition required
for the θ-type. For the other type, the following constraint must hold:
u(q; θ) + u(q; θ)− lii ≥ 2u(q; θ) (24)
Hence, lobbying is effective only if lii ≤ min{u(q; θ)− u(q; θ);ω}.
Now, in order to check the incentive constraint, one needs to specify out-
off equilibrium first posterior beliefs. Let us suppose that
µ(θ|q) =
{
p if q = q
1 if q = q
(25)
Then, the following result holds:
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Claim 15. If q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = q, l∗(·) = lii ≤ min{u(q; θ) − u(q; θ), ω}, and
first and second posterior beliefs satisfy (25) and (23) respectively, then the
incentive constraint of the efficient type is given by ∆(θ) + lii ≤ min{lci, ω}
when p > 1/2, and ∆(θ) ≤ min{lci, ω} when p ≤ 1/2, and there is no
incentive constraint for the inefficient firm.
Proof. First, let us examine the case where p ≤ 1/2 which implies a decision
d = d of the agency if there is pooling on output. An optimal lobbying
decision is then to set l˜ = 0. Furthermore, the θ-firm has no incentives to
deviate since it gets its maximum payoff. For the θ-firm, let us denote l(q)
the amount of lobbying necessary for it to induce a positive decision d when
its choice of output is q. Then, this firm prefers q over q if and only if
2u(q; θ) + ω − l(q) ≤ u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω (26)
when it can and indeed chooses to lobby, and if and only if
2u(q; θ) ≤ u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω (27)
otherwise. By assumption (25), one must have l(q) = lci. Hence, there is
no profitable deviation if and only if ∆(θ) ≤ lci and ∆(θ) ≤ ω, i.e., if and
only if ∆(θ) ≤ min{lci, ω}. Consider now the case where p > 1/2, which
implies that d = d if there is no lobbying by both types. Given the second
posterior beliefs (23), l = l˜ = lii is optimal, provided that lobbying is effective
(see Claim 14). Concerning the choice of q, one has to insure that firm θ’s
incentive constraint is satisfied. This firm prefers q over q if and only if
2u(q; θ) + ω − l(q) ≤ u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω − lii (28)
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when it can and indeed chooses to lobby, and if and only if
2u(q; θ) ≤ u(q; θ) + u(q; θ) + ω − lii (29)
otherwise. By assumption (25), one must have l(q) = lci. Hence, there is no
profitable deviation if and only if ∆(θ) + lii ≤ lci and ∆(θ) + lii ≤ ω, i.e., if
and only if ∆(θ) + lii ≤ min{lci, ω}.
Merging Claim 13, Claim 14, and Claim 15 yields Proposition 4. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the effect of a reform that increases Ψ
from Ψ1 to Ψ2 with Ψ1, Ψ2 ∈ IΨ. Let h be the strictly increasing function
that associates to each level of Ψ a level of the imitation cost ∆(θ). An
examination of the conditions that define the feasible equilibria suggests to
consider the cases where lci ≤ ω and lci > ω in turn.
So, first assume that lci ≤ ω. Then, by Proposition 3, AΨ1 ∈ {Pl(Ψ1), Sl(Ψ1)}
and AΨ2 ∈ {Pl(Ψ2), Sl(Ψ2)}. To conclude that reforming an antidumping
legislation of type Ψ1 with one of type Ψ2 (Ψ1 < Ψ2) cannot worsen welfare,
one only needs to show that a move from Sl(Ψ1) to Pl(Ψ2) is not possible.
Suppose it is, i.e., that AΨ1 ∈ {Sl(Ψ1)} and AΨ2 ∈ {Pl(Ψ2)}. By Proposition
3, h(Ψ1) ≥ l
ci and by Proposition 4, h(Ψ2)+l
ii ≤ lci which implies h(Ψ2) < l
ci
since lii > 0 when p > 1/2. Combining these inequalities yields h(Ψ2) <
h(Ψ1) which says that h is strictly decreasing, a contradiction.
Let us now examine the case with lci > ω. By Proposition 3, AΨ1 ∈
{Pl(Ψ1), Snl(Ψ1)} and AΨ2 ∈ {Pl(Ψ2), Snl(Ψ2)}. To conclude that reforming
Ψ1 with Ψ2 weakly enhances welfare, one needs to show that a move from
Snl(Ψ1) to Pl(Ψ2) is ruled out by our assumption about h. Suppose not, i.e.,
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that AΨ1 ∈ {Snl(Ψ1)} and AΨ2 ∈ {Pl(Ψ2)}. By Proposition 3, h(Ψ1) > l
ci
and by Proposition 4, h(Ψ2) + l
ii ≤ ω, the latter inequality implying that
h(Ψ2) < ω, since l
ii > 0 when p > 1/2. Thus, h(Ψ2) < h(Ψ1), which is a
contradiction. 2
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